We present a noncooperative game model of coalitional bargaining, closely based on that of Gul (1989) but solvable by backward induction. In this game, Gul's condition of`value additivity' does not su ce to ensure the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that supports the Shapley value, but a related condition -`no positive value-externalities' -does. Multiple equilibria can arise only in the event of ties, and with a mild restriction on tie-break rules these equilibria all support the Shapley value.
INTRODUCTION
This paper builds on the important contribution by Gul (1989 Gul ( , 1999 within a literature of the last three decades that provides`bargaining foundations' to solution concepts in cooperative game theory. This literature, in the spirit of the`Nash program', treats the noncooperative and cooperative approaches as mutually illuminative. Gul sets up an intuitively plausible noncooperative bargaining process in which coalitions form through successive pairwise amalgamations (presented as buyouts), and shows that this process is in certain senses supportive of the well known value of Shapley (1953) . The process is in nite: coalitional bargaining is allowed to continue for as long as the grand coalition has not formed, and takes place alongside the underlying cooperative event. These aspects of the set-up have certain advantages in terms of mathematical tractability, but also certain disadvantages: in particular, where there are subgame perfect Nash equilibria that support the Shapley value there may also be others that do not. In this paper we modify Gul's bargaining process so that it is nite and so that it precedes the underlying cooperative event. The noncooperative game is then solvable by backward induction and we can therefore draw sharper conclusions about the relationship between its subgame perfect Nash equilibria and the Shapley value of the underlying cooperative game.
In Gul's bargaining game,`value-additivity' ensures that some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) implements the Shapley value, but not that every SPNE does so. In our modi ed bargaining game it requires a stronger condition -`no positive value-externalities' -to ensure the existence of a SPNE that implements the Shapley value, but the same condition then ensures that every SPNE implements the value.
PRELIMINARIES
We consider any transferable utility game in characteristic function form (N; v), with N denoting a set of n players, v : 2 N ! R having properties (i) For present purposes, it su ces just to view the generalized Shapley value as a formal object; but the intuition is that it assigns expectations to prior coalitions, and it does so by treating the prior coalitions as players in a subgame, and by applying the Shapley value to that subgame. Clearly
We shall de ne two noncooperative games, based on our underlying cooperative game (N; v), each also with player sets N . The in nite time bargaining game is the one set up by Gul, and the deadline bargaining game is our modi cation of Gul's game. In both these games, coalitional bargaining takes place over a sequence of periods. At the start of each period, players are arranged as a partition, or coalition structure, each element being a coalition. At the start of the rst period, the coalition structure is the set of singletons ffig : i 2 N g. At any stage, one player in each coalition is its representative. A player is active if and only if she represents some coalition.
In each period (unless the grand coalition has already formed) there is some opportunity for two coalitions to merge by mutual agreement. Mergers take the form of buy-outs: the representative of one of the coalitions makes a payment to the representative of the other, and becomes the sole representative of the merged coalition. Payo s to embedded coalitions, as speci ed by v, accrue to the representatives of the corresponding coalitions in the bargaining game. The full de nition of each game requires an additional parameter. In the in nite time game, a parameter 2 (0; 1) sets a common discount factor; in the deadline game a natural number parameter sets the length of the game.
In the in nite time game (with discount factor ) the sequence of time periods is in nite: (1; 2; : : :). Players' outcome utilities are given by in-period payments, adjusted by , so for any player a payment amount of 1 in time period t is worth t units of utility. Gul's results, and ours, relate to SPNEs in the bargaining games set out above. To simplify analysis, we assume that ties (situations in which the maximum o er a proposer is willing to make exactly equals the minimum o er a responder is willing to accept) within a SPNE lead to an accepted o er with some xed exogenous probability, or tie-break rule.
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Gul uses two further equilibrium conditions:`stationarity', and that`every possible meeting ends in agreement'.`Stationarity' entails that players' strategies specify (for the same coalition structure) the same behavior in every time period.`Every possible meeting ends in agreement' entails that players' strategies specify, in every situation, o ers by proposers that are deemed acceptable by the corresponding responders, so the grand coalition will form directly, in n 1 time periods.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE INFINITE TIME BARGAINING GAME Gul's (1989 Gul's ( , 1999 analysis is of the in nite time bargaining game, and his results are obtained in a limit as tends to 1.
Gul's rst result states that, in any stationary SPNE such that every possible meeting ends in agreement, the expected utility to any player i at the start of the in nite time bargaining game is arbitrarily close (if is su ciently close to 1) to i . His second result concerns conditions on v for the existence of such an equilibrium. A necessary condition is valueadditivity of v, v being value-additive if and only if:
A su cient condition combines value-additivity with strict superadditivity, v being strictly superadditive if and only if for all non-empty and disjoint
2 It is a straightforward matter to also admit to our analysis more elaborate tie-break rules in which the probability of agreement in a tie depends on the time period, the coalition structure, the players represented by the proposer and the players represented by the responder. However, because of the backward induction analysis we use, we cannot admit tie-break rules that depend otherwise on the history of the game or on the speci c identities of coalitions' representatives. Gul (1989 Gul ( , 1999 incorporates a similar limitation into his full`stationarity' condition. So (in the limit, as tends to 1) the in nite time game supports the Shapley value, but only provided that v is both superadditive and valueadditive, and then only in one SPNE among possible others (which are non-stationary, or in which possible meetings do not end in agreement). 
ANALYSIS OF THE DEADLINE BARGAINING GAME
Our analysis is of the deadline bargaining game, and our results are obtained in a limit as tends to 1:
The deadline bargaining game preserves Gul's plausible, intuitive procedure of pairwise agreement but, for a given tie-break rule, it has a unique SPNE which can be found by backward induction. Our main result employs a new condition on v, stronger than value-additivity: no positive valueexternalities, de ned as follows. There are no positive value externalities in v if and only if:
Theorem 1 If there are no positive value-externalities in v then, for any " > 0, there is an integer t such that, for any > t, in every SPNE of the deadline bargaining game (of length ), the expected utility of every player i lies within " of i .
(The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix.)
So, if there are no positive value-externalities in v then (in the limit as tends to 1) the deadline bargaining game supports the Shapley value in every SPNE. Relative to the in nite time game, the deadline bargaining game supports the Shapley value less equivocally, but on a smaller class of cooperative games. The condition of no positive value-externalities states that within the generalized Shapley value every externality associated with any bilateral amalgamation is non-positive, whereas Gul's value-additivity condition can be read as saying that (since the generalized Shapley value summed across any partition is, by construction, equal to the payo of the grand coalition) the sum of value-externalities associated with any bilateral amalgamation is non-positive.
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Having observed that a stronger condition than value-additivity ensures, in the relevant limit, that every SPNE in the deadline game supports the Shapley value, we should note the following.
Remark 1 Value-additivity, even combined with strict superadditivity, is not su cient (unless there are fewer than 5 players) to ensure that there exists at least one SPNE of the deadline game that supports the Shapley value.
(The proof of Remark 1 is in the Appendix.)
ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
The proof of Theorem 1 leads also to two further results. First, recall that in the in nite time game the condition of value-additivity (plus strict superadditivity) ensures the existence of a stationary SPNE that supports the Shapley value, but fails to ensure the non-existence of a stationary SPNE that does not. We nd that the condition of no positive value-externalities model is based on that of Gul (1989) , and retains its key feature, which is that cooperative structures arise through sequences of bilateral agreements.
In contrast, in alternative implementations of the Shapley value such as
proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) and P erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) the coalition structure changes only once, and there is never more than one non-singleton coalition. Which of these modelling strategies is more useful depends on the bargaining procedure that is to be represented.
However, many institutional frameworks for real-world bargaining, most notably the merger and takeover process by which rms amalgamate 5 , involve sequences of coalition formation similar to those of our model. It is therefore striking to nd that the Shapley value -a concept that is often interpreted as based on normative axioms -can emerge as the outcome in a noncooperative model of bargaining that is applicable to such institutions. 6 Whether the Shapley value does so emerge depends on properties of the underlying cooperative game. Gul (1989, p. 90) suggests that value-additivity is \key in determining whether a given characteristic function game constitutes a suitable framework for the application of the Shapley value". Our results in this paper suggest rather that a closely related, but stronger condition is key in this sense. Value-additivity (combined with strict superadditivity) ensures that Gul's in nite time bargaining game has a stationary SPNE that supports the Shapley value but there may be other stationary SPNEs that do not.
In our deadline bargaining game, value-additivity and strict superadditivity do not guarantee the existence of a SPNE that supports the Shapley value.
However, the condition of no positive value-externalities ensures that every stationary SPNE in Gul's game and every SPNE in our game supports the Shapley value.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Our proofs are constructed using the set of games in partition function form on the player set N , generically w : M ! R such that, for any 2 , w(?; ) = 0 and P I2 w(I; ) w (N; fN g ). Notice that in any SPNE of the deadline bargaining game, with any given number of time periods remaining, for each embedded coalition (I; ), there is a well-de ned expectation: i.e. the expected value of future in-period payments to the player who represents I. The function that assigns these expectations to embedded coalitions is an element of . Also, is an element of .
In the deadline game, each SPNE corresponds to a tie-break rule: the exogenously given probability with which, when the maximum o er a proposer is willing to make exactly equals the minimum o er a responder is willing to accept, this o er is accepted. We denote this probability 2 [0; 1].
For a given SPNE, the relationship between expectations in adjacent time periods can be described using formal constructions that we shall term backward induction sequences. The items within these sequences are elements of . In this appendix we shall rst de ne a backward induction sequence and then set down a lemma in respect of this construction. Theorem 1 and also Remarks 2 and 3 follow almost immediately from the lemma. Remark 1 is proved by an example. 
A.1. Backward induction sequences
We need to set up some additional notation: terms that describe the internal and external e ects, within some w 2 , of coalitions amalgamating. .
We now consider the deadline bargaining game (of length ) de ned on v. Suppose, in the SPNE associated with the tie-break rule , with t < periods remaining in this game, expected future payments to the remaining active players are described by w t 2 . That is, the player that represents coalition I within the coalition structure expects a sum of payments over periods (( t); ( t+1); :::; ) equal to w t (I; ). By backward induction, in the same equilibrium of the bargaining game, with t + 1 periods remaining, : (1) We de ne a backward induction sequence to be a sequence fw t g 1 t=0 in with the property that there exists 2 [0; 1] such that, for any non-negative integer t, equation (1) is satis ed.
A.2. Lemma 1
We can now state our Lemma.
Lemma 1 For any w 2 , if T (w) has no positive value-externalities, then for any " > 0, there exists t 0 2 N such that, for any t > t 0 , for any (I; ) 2 M , in any backward induction sequence fw t g 1 t=0 with w 0 = w, jw t (I; ) (T (w))(I; )j < ".
A.3. Proof of Lemma 1
For any w 2 we de ne e w w (T (w)). (T (w)) has, by construction, the following`e ciency' property:
And it also has, using results in McQuillin (2009) (Theorems 3 and 2 respectively), the following two properties:
(T ( (T (w)))) = (T (w)): Any backward induction sequence fw t g 1 t=0 has the following properties:
And (using (4) and (6)):
We now consider some partition function game w : M ! R such that T (w) has no positive value-externalities, and we consider the set of all backward induction sequences fw t g 1 t=0 with w 0 = w. We write this set as ffw ;t g 
Using (2) and (3):
We proceed by induction. (We simplify the induction hypothesis by disregarding epsilons.) Suppose, for some positive integers k > 2 and t 0 :
8t 2 Z >t 0 ; 8 2 [0; 1]; 8(A; ) 2 M; j j 6 k ! g w ;t (A; ) = 0: (10) ( (6) and (7) establish this hypothesis for k = 2.) Our aim is to show that then:
8" > 0; 9t 00 2 Z >t 0 ; 8 2 ; 8t 2 Z >t 00 ; 8 2 [0; 1]; 8(A; ) 2 M; Now consider any B 2 such that g w ;t (B; ) > 0: Note (recollecting the steps that led to (13)):
Note also:
8fI; Jg 2 n fBg; G fI;Jg
Combining (9), (18) and (19) gives:
Combining (8) and (20), and collecting terms gives:
It is clear from (5), (17) and (21) and f4g or between f3g and f5g.) But it transpires that it is to the second of these stationary points, which is not (v) , that the (unique) backward induction sequence fw t g 1 t=0 with w 0 S(v) converges. The graphs in Figures  2 and 3 plot the associated sequence ff w t g 1 t=0 , f w t w t (v), for coalitions embedded in the nest coalition structure (Figure 2) , and in coalition structures of cardinality four ( Figure 3 ). (Figure 3 shows six of the ten coalition structures of cardinality four, the remainder, entailing coalitions f1; 3g, f1; 5g, f3; 4g and f3; 5g, follow by symmetries with those shown entailing f1; 2g, f1; 4g, f2; 5g and f2; 4g respectively.) Figure 2 illustrates, for example, that the sequence ff w t (f1g; ff1g ; f2g ; f3g ; f4g ; f5gg)g A.6. Proof of Remark 2 Gul (1989) shows that, in the limit as tends to 1, in every stationary SPNE of the in nite time bargaining game de ned on v, at the start of any time period, expected future payments to the remaining active players are described by some w 2 that is a stationary point in a backward induction sequence and that ful ls the following:
8(I; ) 2 M; j j 6 2 ! w (I; ) = (v)(I; ):
If w ful ls equation (23) 
A.7. Proof of Remark 3
In any SPNE of the deadline bargaining game (of length ) de ned on (N; w), the expected utility to player i is given by the term w (fig; ffjg : j 2 N )g) in a backward induction sequence fw t g 1 t=0 with w 0 = w. So, by Lemma 1 we directly have the result that (as tends to 1) the extended Shapley value is supported by the deadline game (in every SPNE). Analogous reasoning to that used in the proof of Remark 2 gives the result that (as tends to 1) the extended Shapley value is supported by the in nite time game (in every stationary SPNE). 
